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Abstract
Cardiac Implantable Electronic Devices (CIED) are fast becoming a funda-
mental tool of advanced medical technology and a key instrument in saving
lives. Despite their importance, previous studies have shown that CIED are
not completely secure against cyber attacks and especially those who are
exploiting their Radio Frequency (RF) communication interfaces. Further-
more, the telemetry capabilities and IP connectivity of the external devices
interacting with the CIED are creating other entry points that may be used
by attackers. Although the majority of these vulnerabilities are more like
proof of concepts or in-the-lab experiments and that there are no indicators
of active exploitation or in the wild abuse, it remains crucial to perform
a risk analysis to measure how viable these attacks are, their impact and
consequently the risk exposure. In this paper, we carry out a realistic risk
analysis of such attacks. This analysis is composed of three parts. First,
an actor-based analysis to determine the impact of the attacks. Second, a
scenario-based analysis to determine the probability of occurrence of each
threat. Finally, a combined analysis to determine which attack outcomes
(i.e. attack goals) are riskiest and to identify the vulnerabilities that con-
stitute the highest overall risk exposure. The conducted study showed that
the vulnerabilities associated with the RF interface of CIED represent an
acceptable risk. In contrast, the network and internet connectivity of exter-
nal devices represent an important potential risk. The previously described
findings suggest that the highest risk is associated with external systems and
not the CIED itself. A noteworthy observation that emerged from the risk
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analysis is the fact that the damages of these cyber attacks could spread
further to affect parties other than patients such as device manufacturers
through intellectual property theft or medical practitioners through affecting
their reputation. This research work has contributed to extend the knowl-
edge in terms of quantifying the risk associated not only to CIED devices
but also to their ecosystem. The results of this study could be considered
as a base for CIED risk management procedures as they help to measure
the impact of different attacks while taking into consideration the attackers
goals, identifying attack scenarios as well as their likelihood of occurrence
and determining which threat has to be addressed in priority.
Keywords: Cardiac Implantable Electronic Device, CIED, cyber security,
cyber attack, vulnerabilities, attack vectors, attack scenarios, actor-based
risk analysis, scenario-based risk analysis
1. Introduction
Cardiac implantable electronic devices (CIED) have evolved from single-
chamber pacing devices to resynchronization and defibrillation within the
same device [1] . Modern CIED now include numerous functionalities be-
ing integrated into a single device, which has contributed to an increase
in the number of implanted devices[2, 3]. Besides, the use of telemetry-
enabled CIED is increasing at the detriment of older models with no wireless-
communication capabilities [4, 5], due to the significant advantages it brings
to patient care [6, 7]. For the remainder of this article, the acronym CIED
will refer only to telemetry-enabled CIED.
CIED interact with external systems located in the hospital (the external pro-
grammer), the patient’s home (the home monitor) and in the cloud [5, 8, 9].
They communicate with the external programmer and the home-monitoring
device via Radio Frequency (RF) signals transmitted in the Medical Im-
plants Communication Services band (MICS 402-405 Mhz) [2, 10, 11, 12, 13],
whereas they interact with cloud-based systems by means of the home-
monitoring device and Internet Protocol (IP) connectivity [6, 7, 9].
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External programmers are used by the physicians ab initio when configur-
ing the devices prior to implantation and during patient follow-up sessions
to retrieve data and for reconfiguration. They have three modes of oper-
ation: 1) the interrogation mode to check a patient’s cardiac programmed
parameters and stored data, 2) the test mode to test that the implant is
operating properly, and 3) the programming mode which allows the physi-
cian to adjust the patient’s therapy by reconfiguring the functionality of the
CIED [4, 5]. Reconfiguration after manufacturing is feasible since current
CIED circuitry is microprocessor-controlled and its software can be updated
[3, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20].
Home monitoring devices are intended to supervise the patient’s cardiac sta-
tus. They periodically collect activity data from the CIED and send it to
a cloud-based database. The latter may be operated by either the CIED
manufacturing company or a web services provider used by the physician to
access the patient’s data [6, 7, 9].
As evidenced by previous work, CIED are vulnerable to cyber attacks that
use their RF interfaces to communicate with the devices [21, 22]. This is also
true for non-telemetry enabled CIED, but telemetry introduces additional
vectors of cyber attacks that can include manipulation of the home moni-
tor, interception of transmissions from the home monitor to the cloud and
the physician’s station, and manipulation of the cloud-based database itself
[8, 23]. Proof of the increased concern of cyber attacks on CIED was given
by the recall of almost half a million CIED by the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA) in August 2017. According to the FDA, the aforementioned
devices were vulnerable to unauthorized access, allowing a malicious person
to reprogram them using commercially available equipment [24]. However,
no such attacks have been reported. While we know it would be technically
possible to conduct such an attack in the controlled environment of a research
laboratory [21, 22, 8], it remains to be determined how viable such an attack
would be on an actual target in the real world. This is precisely our research
question: What are the real-life risks of cyber attack onto telemetry-enabled
CIED and the systems they depend on?
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In this work, we carry out a realistic risk analysis of such attacks, with re-
gards to actual impact these problems pose in terms of: health, economy,
quality of life and privacy of the affected parties. In order to carry this risk
analysis, we inventory the vulnerabilities that have been made public up to
now, we define attack scenarios based on them, describe and evaluate the
impact of the various attack goals that various actors would want to achieve
through such attack scenarios, and finally estimate the likelihood of occur-
rence of each of these attacks to determine overall risk.
Our motivation to conduct this research is based on the need to understand
the real scope of the problem. After the FDA statement was released, pa-
tients began to massively call their cardiologists to get an explanation about
these potential failures and to what extent they were in danger. It is at times
difficult for physicians to answer them, since cybersecurity is not their field
of expertise and because there is little information about the clinical impact
of exploitation of the vulnerabilities found. This is why we believe that such
a “reality check” is necessary, as the real scope of the problem it is not clear
at all. By determining the scope of the problem we contribute to 1) extend
the knowledge of the threats affecting CIED, 2) provide guidance on which
threats should be addressed in priority and consequently 3) provide to the
organizations potentially interested in this kind of risk assessment a basis
from where to start, e.g. health regulation agencies, device manufacturer,
health practitioners, etc.
2. Background on CIED
2.1. CIED computer-based architecture
Few documentary sources on CIED architecture and design are available,
due to the proprietary nature of that information. Nonetheless, common
principles and some technical details are generally documented in some of
the corresponding patents [3, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20]. As depicted in Figure 1,
today’s software-based CIED circuitry is mainly composed of four electronic
components with the first one being the microprocessor which is the “brain”
of the CIED. It coordinates, controls and directs the interactions between
the elements of the circuit. It also interprets and executes the algorithms
programmed in memory. The second component is the memory, CIED holds
two kinds of memories: Read-Only Memory (ROM) and Random-Access
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Figure 1: CIED circuitry
Memory (RAM). The ROM contains the embedded software (also known as
firmware) providing low-level control of the device’s hardware, as well as the
code implementing the various functionalities of the device. While the RAM
is taking care of storing a variety of parameters, such as device serial num-
ber, patient ID, clinical information, patient’s cardiac activity (arrhythmia
logs, frequency histograms) and certain programs implementing particular
therapies. The third component dubbed the telemetry circuitry is used to
establish a communication link between the CIEDand external devices, such
as the external programmer or a home monitor. More specifically, the teleme-
try circuitry allows performing remote monitoring, therapy adjustment and
reprogramming the CIED prior to implantation or during patient follow-up
sessions. The fourth electrical component is the timing circuit which is a key
element on the CIED circuitry as it takes care of synchronizing the stimula-
tion pulses to the cardiac chambers as well as the memory access.
The previously described components are interacting together to maintain
the CIED functionalities, each one of them has a specific task that has to be
executed in a coordinated way. A good example of these multi-component
interactions would be the automatic therapy selection loop (Figure 2). This
process is performed at the microprocessor level using signals coming from
the detection probes that are continuously monitoring and re-transmitting
the cardiac activity to the microprocessor. The re-transmitted signals are
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Figure 2: Therapy selection loop
then interpreted in order to select the adequate therapy code from the RAM.
Finally, the selected code is translated to a low-level instruction set (located
in the ROM) before being executed by the microprocessor. It is also im-
portant to mention that the treating physician is responsible of determining
which therapies can be applied under what conditions.
The clinician uses the programmer’s user interface to program or adjust the
parameters of the patient therapy (i.e., number of beats per second). When
fixing a therapy parameter on the programmer user interface, the external
device subsequently sends to the CIED an instruction containing the change
to perform on the therapy. The telemetry circuitry receives this instruction
and then sent it to the microprocessor. Following the interpretation of the
instruction, the microprocessor will access the RAM to perform the required
change. (Figure 3).
2.2. CIED ecosystem
The CIED ecosystem (Figure 4) encompasses the set of devices, cloud-based
systems and cloud-based services employed for the diagnosis, the therapy’s
adjustment and the monitoring of patients with an implanted CIED. Apart
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Figure 3: Therapy adjustment
from the CIED itself, there are two other medical devices forming part of
this ecosystem. These are, the external programmer usually located at the
hospital and the monitor located at the patient’s home. Health professionals
rely on the external programmer to obtain the programmed parameters of
the patient, to adjust the desired therapies or to check the correct operation
of the CIED [4, 5]. The home monitor is used to periodically collect the data
stored in the CIED and send them to a cloud-based database (DB). Thus,
medical staff can access a patient’s health information through a web-based
application, operated either by the CIED manufacturer or a separate cloud
service provider [6, 7, 9]. It is fair to say that the monitor is a key element of
this system of systems as it is through him that some CIED data are avail-
able on the cloud-based elements of the ecosystem in study. By cloud-based
elements, we refer to the cloud-based database containing the information
coming from the monitor, the cloud-based application displaying this infor-
mation and, the cloud-based server containing the application. Moreover, the
set of devices employed to use the application mentioned above (e.g. smart-
phones, tablets, and laptops) form also part of the ecosystem of CIED.
The CIED interact with all the elements of their ecosystem. Depending on
the element, the interaction could be either direct or indirect. Direct interac-
tion takes place with both the external programmer at the hospital and the
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Figure 4: CIED’s ecosystem.
home monitor device, while indirect interaction occurs with the cloud-based
systems and services. We distinguish the type of interaction since as we will
see later (Section 6.2), it determines the kind of attacks that can be carried
out.
Direct interaction consists of wireless communication between the CIED
and a programmer or a home monitor device. Indeed, current pacing devices
include two types of wireless technology. The first, referred to as Inductive-
coil telemetry, uses an inductive RF field (0-300 kHz) to communicate over
short ranges (0-10 cm), requiring proximity between the CIED and the an-
tenna coil of the external programs. The second mode referred to as RF-link
telemetry, uses a radiating RF field (i.e. traditional RF waves) at a higher
frequency (402-405 MHz) to communicate over longer ranges (0-200 m) [25].
Both technologies can be used for interrogation and programming operations
during follow-up visits at the hospital. The main difference between them
is that with inductive coil telemetry it is necessary to apply a programming
head1 right above the CIED to establish communications, while with RF
link this can be achieved without such proximity; it is therefore referred to
as “wand-less” [4, 5]. Nowadays, the trend is to use RF-link telemetry to the
1A programming head is an sub-component of the programmer serving as a security
switch that can activate or deactivate data transmission to/from the CIED.
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detriment of the inductive-coil telemetry, since it has a better conductivity
in the human body, a higher data rate, a greater communication range, and
thus constitutes a more adequate option for home monitoring [4, 5]. This
technology operates on the Medical Implant Communications Service (MICS)
core band (402-405 MHz) initially allocated by the Federal Communication
Commission (FCC) in 1999 [12], and that has subsequently been adopted in
different regions of the world [10, 2].
The MICS spectrum was established in order to support data transmission
between any implanted and external device for diagnostic and therapeutic
purposes, not only for CIED [10, 13]. However, since this band is shared with
communication devices used by meteorological services, its use has been nor-
malized to avoid any interference [2, 11, 12]. These rules of use are based on
ITU-R Recommendation2 SA.1346 [26], whose broad outline is the following:
• The MICS spectrum is divided into 10 transmission channels with a
bandwidth of 300 kHz each.
• The implanted devices can only transmit after receiving a command
from an external device authorizing them to do so (there are exceptions
such as emergencies).
• External devices must integrate interference mitigation techniques, such
as Listen Before Talk (LBT) and Adaptive Frequency Agility (AFA)
to minimize the effect of ambient noise. External device radio trans-
mitters use LBT to sense their radio environment before starting a
transmission, in order to identify a free channel with least interference,
i.e. the Least Interference Channel (LIC). Channel verification is done
five seconds before initiating a transmission, with each channel being
monitored for 10 ms to determine if it is occupied. Then, based on the
sensed information the transmitters use the AFA technique to select an
operating frequency that is not in use yet [27, 28].
Although the use of the transmission means adheres to an internationally-
adopted standard and is carefully regulated, the same cannot be said for
signal-conditioning techniques or CIED access control mechanisms. While
2The ITU-R Recommendations are international technical standards elaborated by the
Radiocommunication sector of the International Telecommunication Union.
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the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)3determines
privacy and security rules for the protection of medical data transmitted be-
tween systems, these remain very general and are more oriented towards tra-
ditional Information Technology (IT) systems such as computers and servers.
While the FDA has defined good practice guidelines in this area, they do
not establish legally enforceable responsibilities [29, 30] so their application
remains optional. This legislative vacuum results in an overabundance of
proprietary communication and authentication protocols, where it is up to
each manufacturer to set their own criteria and choose the security methods
to apply to their devices.
Indirect interaction occurs between the CIED and the cloud-based systems
or services when those are employed to display the information contained in
the CIED. Health practitioners have the ability to access the collected data
using their own portable devices via connection to the cloud-based web appli-
cation through a regular Internet connection. This approach aims to improve
the quality of patient care and the working conditions of medical staff while
reducing health costs. Thus, even if strictly speaking there is no direct com-
munication between the CIED and these systems, there is still a data link
between them. Nonetheless, current CIED features do not include the capa-
bility to download information from the DB server, and in principle cannot
be remotely reconfigured by the health practitioners from the monitors.
In summary, CIED operate in a complex and heterogeneous ecosystem com-
posed of various devices connected to different networks and using multiple
communication protocols to interact with each other. The necessity to re-
duce health costs is propelling a worldwide transformation of health service
management that relies precisely on the interaction between medical devices
and health practitioners. Nevertheless, this interaction, which is undoubt-
edly beneficial for all stakeholders, may have turned into a significant attack
surface for cyber attacks against the CIED ecosystem [31].
3The HIPAA was created in 1996 to enhance the performance of the U.S healthcare
system. The progressive adoption of IT in the health services has led to the inclusion of
security and privacy rules on the HIPPA. Those rules protect the sensitive data of the
patients that are electronically stored or transmitted .
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3. Background on Implantable Medical Devices (IMD)cybersecurity
The security threats that affect CIED apply to all IMD. The latter are vul-
nerable to malicious exploitation of (i) their RF communication interfaces,
and (ii) the telemetry functionalities and IP connectivity of the extracorpo-
real equipment on which they depend. In this section, we develop a critical
review of the literature on cyber threats affecting IMD and risk assessments
regarding IMD risk exposure to cyber attacks. We proceed in this way for
two reasons. First, there is no abundant and exclusive literature on the
cybersecurity threats of CIED. Second, we claim that the risk assessment
methodology proposed here applies to all IMD.
3.1. IMD Cyber Threats
In the last decade, several research groups have exposed vulnerabilities in
implantable medical devices (IMD), such as insulin pumps and, of course,
CIED. Below, we chronologically describe these findings.
In 2008, Halperin et al. [21] unveiled CIED vulnerabilities to radio frequency-
based attacks. By making use of a software-defined radio (SDR), the re-
searchers succeeded in reverse engineering the device’s communication proto-
col and conducting attacks such as sensitive data interception and dangerous
command emission (electric shock dispensation).
In 2011, Hei et al. [32] found vulnerabilities that allow resource depletion
attacks on insulin pumps. They demonstrated that by sending periodic wire-
less commands to the IMD, it was possible to keep an active communication
session permanently opened, thus significantly reducing the device’s service
lifetime. During the same year, Li et al. [33] disclosed insulin pump vul-
nerabilities that allow unauthorized parties to communicate with the device.
In fact, their work revealed that some insulin pump models possess a class
of vulnerability that can allow an unauthorized party to “emulate the full
functions of a remote control: wake up the insulin pump, stop/resume the
insulin injection, or immediately inject a bolus dose of insulin into the hu-
man body”[23]. That same year, Jerome Radcliffe, a patient with diabetes,
partially reverse-engineered the communication protocols of his insulin pump.
He announced his findings at the Black Hat cybersecurity conference.
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In 2012, the hacker Barnaby Jack demonstrated that certain CIED mod-
els can disclose their authentication credentials following the reception of a
specific command [34]. He was also able to verify that the access codes of
some devices are simply their serial and model number. Paradoxically, this
information is disclosed by some CIED models when they receive a specific
command from an external programmer or a home-monitoring device. This
discovery highlighted that an unauthorized party could gain control of cer-
tain CIEDs by simply sending a command [23, 35].
In 2016, Marin et al. [22] used a black-box reverse-engineering4 approach to
analyze the proprietary communication protocols employed by CIED to com-
municate with external programmers over a long-range RF channel. Their
work evidenced that reverse-engineering CIED proprietary communication
protocols is feasible and that they present several implementation weaknesses.
As proof of that, they were able to implement a set of exploits like the inter-
ception of sensitive information, Denial-of-Service (DoS), spoofing and replay
attacks. The findings of this research were reproduced for at least 10 different
models of CIED.
3.2. IMD cybersecurity risk analysis
Even though the first study evidencing vulnerabilities in CIED was published
in 2008 [21], it is only in 2015 i.e seven years later that the first IMD risk
assessment study appears in the literature.
In 2015 Jagannathan and Sorini conducted a full IMD-specific cybersecurity
risk analysis [36]. This study presents a methodology to evaluate medical de-
vices exposure to cybersecurity risks. The method presented is a traditional
Preliminary Hazards Analysis (PHA) study which was tailored to assess the
cybersecurity properties of medical equipment. As any PHA study, their
methodology consists of three main steps namely: 1) hazard identification,
2) risk determination, and 3) risk ranking and follow-up actions. This work
analyses the cybersecurity risk of fictitious medical devices. Thus, its find-
ings do not reflect the actual state of the problem. In our work, we analyze
4Method by which an attacker discovers the structure and function of a software by
interacting indirectly with it, for example through input and output vectors, libraries or
APIs.
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real medical devices that are currently in the market. Therefore, the results
herein find not only illustrate the actual scope of the problem but can serve
as a basis for the risk management procedures related to the CIED ecosystem.
In April 2017, a study by Stine et al. [37] presented a cybersecurity risk
assessment method for network-connected medical devices. This study in-
troduced a scoring system relying on a cybersecurity questionnaire based on
the STRIDE5 model developed by Microsoft for classifying threats [38]. The
scoring system is intended to help healthcare organizations in identifying
those medical devices that have the potential to endanger patient health or
disrupt the quality of medical follow-up. This study estimates the probabil-
ity of occurrence of an attack according to the security features implemented
in the target system. Since the estimate of P is only based on the technical
difficulty of the attacks, it does not adequately reflect reality. Just because
an attack is technically simple to carry out does not mean that an attacker
will be interested in achieving it. The chance and willingness to attack are
essential factors when it comes to estimating P. Accordingly, in our study, we
estimated P in function not only of the characteristics of the target system
but also, in function of specific characteristics of the attacker.
In May 2017, Rios and Butts [8] conducted an exhaustive analysis of the
CIED ecosystem and the interdependence between its elements. The hard-
ware and software components of different models of CIED, external pro-
grammers and home-monitoring devices from different manufacturers were
examined. As a result, over 8,000 known vulnerabilities were discovered in
third-party libraries of four external programmer models belonging to four
different manufacturers. Besides, vulnerabilities were found in all CIED eval-
uated. The publication of this work preceded the massive recall of CIED
ordered by the FDA in August 2017, based on the vulnerabilities reported
by the Industrial Control Systems Computer Emergency Response Team
(ICS-CERT) of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This work
identifies the threats and their nature however, the real scope of the risk
that those threats entail is not described. We consider that although there
are vulnerabilities in a system, it is their probability of exploitation and the
5STRIDE is the acronyms of a set of computer attacks namely Spoofing, Tampering,
Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege
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impact that this exploitation has on individuals that determines whether the
vulnerability represents a significant risk or not. In our study, we estimate
the risk of a vulnerability based on the probability that it will be exploited
and, the impact that the exploitation will have on victims.
In 2018, Abrar et al. [39] conducted a risk analysis on cloud computing within
the context of health applications, in order to evaluate their suitability for
the Health Infrastructure System (HIS). The research team identified HIS
vulnerabilities and then analyzed the impact that a security breach would
have on its integrity if the vulnerable elements were deployed in a cloud
computing environment. This paper analyzes a mortgage situation, while we
analyze a real situation, i.e. the risk that current CIED cloud-based services
represent for patient safety.
Our cybersecurity risk assessment is divided into three analysis: 1) actor-
based analysis, 2) scenario-based analysis and 3) combined analysis. On the
first one, we identify the potential actors and determine the impact of the at-
tacks according to four separate aspects: health (H), monetary (M), privacy
(P) and quality of life (QL). Thus, the outcomes of this work may support the
objectives of different kind of organizations potentially interested in CIED
risk assessment, e.g. health regulation agencies, device manufacturer, health
practitioners, etc. On the second analysis, We determine the attack scenarios
and then estimate their probability of occurrence according to the actors ca-
pacity, opportunity and motivation to achieve the attacks. Finally, in the last
analysis, we calculate and characterize the risk associated with each threat
(actor, scenario).
4. CIED ecosystem’s cybersecurity risk assessment methodology
4.1. Aim of the risk assessment methodology
The number of IMD that rely on ICT to ensure patients therapy, diagnosis or
follow-up is increasing. However, unlike traditional ICT systems (computers,
servers, networks...), there is not yet a formal and effective method to assess
the cybersecurity risk incurred by IMD. As mentioned in section 3, even if
the first vulnerabilities were found in 2008, it is only recently in 2015 that
the first IMD risk assessment appears in the literature. Therefore, this area
14
of study is just starting to develop, hence the need for a methodology.
In this work, we propose a method for asses the cybersecurity risk incurred
by CIED, a subcategory of IMD. Our method can be used to guide organiza-
tions interested in conducting risk assessments of CIEDs and can be extended
to other IMD.
4.2. Definitions
We define here the cybersecurity and risk assessment terms used in this
article.
Actor: A person or organization that violates the integrity, privacy or con-
fidentiality of a computer system‘s data to obtain a benefit.
Impact: Quantification of an attack’s effect or consequence on the target or
victim.
Victim: A person or organization that is the subject of a computer attack.
Attack goal: Final effect desired by the actor, resulting in a negative impact
on the target system or victim.
Scenario: Set of actions carried out by the actor to achieve his attack goal.
Threat: A combination of a person with deliberate intent (actor) comit-
ting acts in particular fashion (scenario), resulting in a negative consequence
(impact).
Vulnerability: A design, manufacturing or programming flaw in a system
that may offer the opportunity to conduct an attack on it.
Attack vector: Subset of vulnerabilities for which there is a demonstrated
attack method by which the vulnerability is employed (exploited) by the
actor to reach its final goal or an intermediate goal towards it (e.g. gaining
access).
Exploit: Subset of attack vectors related to software vulnerabilities.
Probability: Likelihood that a particular threat (a given actor successfully
reaching an attack goal through a given scenario) be materialized during a
given period of time.
Risk: Quantification of a threat (Risk = Impact * Probability).
4.3. Risk assessment methodology
Our risk assessment methodology is divided into three steps:
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Type Level Description of the Impact
Health 1 Minor harm to the patient
2 Significant harm to the patient not involving serious life threatening injuries
3 Severe harm to the patient that involve serious life threatening injuries
4 Catastrophic harm to the patient that involve loss of life
Monetary 1 Minor monetary loss
2 Significant monetary loss
3 Severe monetary loss
4 Catastrophic monetary loss
Quality of life 1 Minor impact on the patient’s quality of life
2 Significant impact on the patient’s quality of life
3 Severe impact on the patient’s quality of life
4 Catastrophic impact on the patient’s quality of life
Privacy 1 Minor impact on the patient privacy if information is disclosed
2 Significant privacy impact if information is disclosed
3 Severe impact on the patient privacy if the information is disclosed
4 Catastrophic impact on the patient privacy if the information is disclosed
Table 1: Impact levels
Step 1. Actor-based risk analysis In this phase, we aim to determine
and quantify the impact of attacks on the CIED ecosystem. To do this,
we first identify potential actors that would be interested in attacking
the CIED ecosystem. Then, we determine their likely attack goals and
from there we quantify the impact on the victim of the successful ac-
complishment of such attack goals. We do this separately according to
four different categories of impact: Health, Monetary, Quality of Life
and Privacy. We measure the impact on health by applying the Hayes
classification approach [40] that was introduced to classify the impact of
different levels of clinically significant electromagnetic interference with
pacemakers. The monetary, quality of life and privacy impacts are mea-
sured using the Fair Information Practice Principles 199 (FIPPS 199)
from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The
FIPPS 199 is a standard for assessing the security of information sys-
tems. The impact is quantified according to a four-level scale described
in Table 1 and discussed in more detail in Section 5.3.
Step 2. Scenario-based risk analysis Here, we estimate the probability
of occurrence of various threats. We start by identifying attack vectors,
i.e. exploitable vulnerabilities, associated with CIED. We found those
attacks vectors on the literature [8, 21, 22, 32], the ICS-CERT advi-
sories [41, 42, 43], the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) main-
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tained by the NIST, and the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposure
(CVE) database maintained by the Mitre Corporation [44, 45, 46, 47,
48, 49, 50, 51] . Next, we describe how these attack vectors can be
strung together into a series of actions, i.e. attack scenarios, that lead
to the achievement of the attack goals (determined in Step 1). Once
this is done, we calculate for each threat, i.e. each (actor, scenario)
pair, its probability of occurrence according to the formula
P = c + o + m (1)
where c, o, and m represent, respectively, an assessment of the actor’s
capacity, opportunity and motivation to conduct the attack scenario
described. More precisely, capacity takes into consideration the tech-
nical complexity of the attack scenario and the technical and material
resources available to the actors to carry it out. The opportunity rep-
resents the actor’s chances of having physical or network access to the
target and being there at the right time to exploit an attack vector and
conduct subsequent scenario actions. Finally, motivation captures the
inherent likelihood that the actor will put the resources in place and
attempt to conduct the attack scenario given what he stands to gain
from successful accomplishment of the attack goal.
Step 3. Combined risk assessment In this last step, we calculate the
overall risk associated with each attack scenario based on the most
likely actor.
R = I ∗ PMAX (2)
Where I is the impact calculated from Step 1, and PMAX is the maxi-
mum actor probability for each attack scenario, as determined in Step 2.
5. Actor-based analysis
5.1. Potential actors
The ICS-CERT has characterized a cyber threat source as “persons who at-
tempt unauthorized access to a control system device and/or network using a
data communications pathway” [52]. It further classifies these threat source
into four groups (A1 through A4):
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A1. Cybercriminals groups This includes traditional cybercriminals groups
that use compromised computer systems to commit identity theft and
online fraud of various kinds, mostly for monetary gain.
A2. Industrial spies Organizations that use computer tools to illegally ac-
quire intellectual property, know-how, trade, and commercial secrets,
or other kinds of corporate confidential information. This kind of espi-
onage occurs between competing corporations, for economic reasons.
A3. Foreign Intelligence Agencies Foreign state-based organizations that
use computer tools to acquire sensitive information on opposing states,
corporations or individuals, or otherwise influence their actions.
A4. Terrorist groups Organizations seeking to create public disorder or
sow national terror, by committing destructive violent acts.
While this taxonomy of cyber threat sources was introduced for traditional
threats to IT infrastructure, we nonetheless proposed to use them in the
context of cyber threats against the CIED ecosystem. To that effect, and
considering the likely objectives [31] and motivations [52] of these actors, we
maintained the six kinds of attack goals (G1 through G6) described herein.
5.2. Attack goals
G1. Access patient sensitive data
CIED ecosystem devices are an attractive target because they constitute a
rich source of information. Beyond medical data, they store other types of
information such as email addresses, residence addresses, telephone numbers,
social security numbers, etc., attractive to many actors. On the one hand,
intelligence services (A3) and terrorist groups (A4) would be interested in
having this information because it would allow them to attain their ultimate
goal (surveillance, assassination, etc.). On the other hand, cybercriminal
groups (A1) would be interested to leverage this information to obtain mon-
etary gain since the medical data of individuals is highly valued in the black
market [53, 54, 55, 56]. Their clients could be for example insurance com-
panies (medical or automotive) that may use this information to assess the
cost of insurance premiums or simply refuse coverage.
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G2. Gain knowledge of device operation and software
There is significant competition between medical-device manufacturers be-
cause of its high-profit margins and high barriers to entry in the market
[57, 58]. Accordingly, CIED ecosystem devices could be a target for in-
dustrial spies (A2) aiming to obtain intellectual property on device design,
software and other kinds of engineering details. Subsequently, such informa-
tion could be sold to competing medical-device manufacturers or possibly to
counterfeit medical devices manufacturers in less regulated countries (simi-
larly to the production of counterfeit or generic pharmaceutical products).
Furthermore, this information is also valuable for criminal groups (A1), in-
telligence services (A3) and terrorist groups (A4) because it allows them to
undertake attacks by maliciously exploiting the device characteristics or op-
erating mode.
G3. Induce medical staff to make errors
Health is one of the main factors of concern for individuals. Hospitals and
their personnel are highly valued in society because individuals trust them
[59, 60, 61, 62]. Some attackers may be interested in damaging the reputa-
tion of health centers or professionals to sow distrust and fear in the society.
These could include foreign intelligence services (A3), terrorist groups (A4),
or even cybercriminal groups (A1). Apart from sowing fear, said actors could
be interested in harming a particular, targeted person. Thus, inducing medi-
cal staff to make errors not only would they be achieving their goal, but they
would also be evading the responsibilities of their actions by making their
interference less detectable.
G4. Disrupt or lower quality of patient follow-up
Cybercriminal groups (A1) could be attracted by those kinds of attacks to
realize extortion, industrial or corporate sabotage. The first objective would
be to disrupt or even interrupt a healthcare provider’s service to demand
money to restore it. The second would be to interfere with a targeted CIED
manufacturer in order to make believe that their CIED equipment is de-
fective, thus damaging the company’s sales revenue and reputation. The
third would be to damage the reputation of a targeted health center or pro-
fessional. For example, disrupting the quality of a target center’s patient
follow-up could decrease public and government trust in the institution, and
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lowering its chances of getting adequate revenue and allocation of public re-
sources. Intelligence services (A3) or terrorists (A4) could be motivated to
conduct such attacks to harm the population of an opposing country.
G5. Alter device behaviour to endanger patient
This constitutes the most potentially worrisome outcome of the cyber attack
against the CIED ecosystem. Indeed, by changing the device settings so that
it has an unexpected or dangerous behavior, actors could seriously endanger
a patient’s life. It is conceivable that foreign intelligence services (A3) and
terrorist groups (A4) targeting particular high-value or highly-visible indi-
viduals might be motivated to use this kind of attack for assassinations or as
a form or extortion or ransom.
G6. Alter device behaviour to decrease quality of life
For the same reasons described above, intelligence services (A3) and terrorist
groups (A4) could be motivated to use similar methods to accomplish non-
lethal disruptive effects on patients by forcing them to repeatedly visit the
clinic due to device malfunction, generate false alarms, or otherwise tamper-
ing with device configuration. Beyond serious harm, such disruptions could
be used to mine the confidence of the population on health providers, de-
vice manufacturers, or create panic and terror (A3 and A4). The possibility
should also be considered that cybercriminals (A1) migrate from traditional
forms of IT-based extortion, such as file-encrypting ransomware, to medical
device-based extortion, e.g. by locking out access by health practitioners to
a patient’s CIED and demanding a ransom to restore it.
In summary, the vulnerability of the CIED ecosystem to cyber attacks is a
matter of concern not only for patients but also for other groups such as
health practitioners, medical device manufacturers and government in gen-
eral.
5.3. Impact of attack goals
Independently of the various actors goals and motivations, these attacks will
have an impact on the victim, whether the patients themselves or those other
groups affected. In order to account for the various types of consequences
that these attacks could have on them, we measure impact according to four
separate aspects: health (H), monetary (M), privacy (P) and quality of life
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Attacks goal H M QL P
G1 Access patient sensitive data - 1 - 2
G2 Gain knowledge of device operation and software - 4 - -
G3 Induce medical staff to make errors 4 3 1 -
G4 Disrupt or lower quality of patient follow-up 2 3 1 -
G5 Alter device behaviour to endanger patient 4 3 - -
G6 Alter device behaviour to decrease quality of life - 2 2 -
Table 2: Impact results by attack goal
(QL). We chose these four factors because affecting them negatively align
precisely with the attack goals we have previously discussed in Section 5.2.
Furthermore, by separating our analysis for these factors, we aim to support
different agendas and objectives of those organizations potentially interested
in this kind of risk assessment, e.g. health regulation agencies, device man-
ufacturers, health practitioners, etc. The impact scale ranges from 1 to 4,
with 4 being the highest impact level (most severe). The description of the
impact levels can be found in Table 1 and the summary of the analysis is
presented in the Table 2. The explanation of the impact analysis by attack
goal follows.
G1 (P) While confidential, the information disclosed would not have a severe
consequences (except maybe in terms of insurability) and is likely to
exist in other or be otherwise available to actors through other sources
or other more traditional forms of cyber attacks no related to CIED.
(M) The disclosure of this information may be grounds for legal action
against the hospital and the manufacturer.
G2 (M) The medical device industry is very profitable, and competition
between manufacturers is fierce. Losses due to intellectual property
theft could reach tens of millions of dollars.
G3 (H) We consider the worst case scenario: the dependent patient (i.e. one
that cannot survive without the device) for whom the doctor does not
make the appropriate diagnosis potentially leading to loss of life. (M)
The doctor and hospital could face severe penalties. (QL) The patient’s
quality of life would be affected if G3 is achieved.
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G4 (H) An interruption in the patient’s follow-up could have harmful effects
on the patient’s health, for example if an arrhythmic even occured and
there is delay in initiating treatment. (M) For certain health services,
time is money: the interruption of a service for a long period of time
can produce losses of millions of dollars for the health organization.
(QL) The patient’s quality of life would be affected because of the long
waits at the hospital or the increase in the number of hospital visits.
G5 (H) Worst case scenario, death of dependent patients. (M) In the event
of a legal action, the company could face significant economic penalties.
Moreover, the manufacturer could lose market share or have its devices
removed from the market by regulators.
G6 (M) The equipment could be removed from the market, causing eco-
nomic losses to the company. (QL) The patient would feel a temporary
discomfort.
6. Scenario-based risk analysis
6.1. Vulnerabilities
We now inventory the vulnerabilities (Vi) affecting the CIED ecosystem. We
have harvested this information from several sources, including ICS-CERT
advisories, the NVD maintained by the NIST, the CVE database maintained
by the Mitre Corporation and previous research in this area [8, 21, 22, 32].
We separated the vulnerabilities in three groups, depending on what devices
they affect, with some of them applicable to more than one type of device
(i.e. V9, V10). We have inventoried 15 vulnerabilities, enumerated in Table 3
6, and explained in detail in the following paragraphs.
V1: Weak authentication algorithms
Certain CIED use Time-based One-time Password (TOP) for authen-
tication. The external devices authenticate to the CIED by computing
a password from the current time and a shared secret, i.e. a secret
cryptographic key shared between the CIED and both the external
programmer and the home-monitoring device, for certain CIED the
6In this dissertation, we maintained the original names of the vulnerabilities, i.e., the
technical names with which they appear on the source where we extracted them.
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Vulnerability description
CIED
V1 Weak authentication algorithms
V2 Boundless telemetry session duration
V3 Unencrypted data storage and transmission
V4 Lack of command whitelisting techniques
Programmer
V5 Unencrypted hardcoded authentication credentials
V6 Software directory path traversal
V7 Improper restriction of communication channel
V8 Unprotected removable media/hard-drives
V9 Unprotected USB serial port connections
V10 Exploiting embedded debugging interfaces (JTAG and UART)
Monitor
V9 Unprotected USB serial port connections
V10 Exploiting embedded debugging interfaces (JTAG and UART)
V11 OS hardcoded authentication credentials
V12 Exposed dangerous methods or functions
V13 Server hardcoded authentication credentials
V14 Hardcoded server parameters
V15 Exploiting remote firmware update
Table 3: List of vulnerabilities
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secret key is their serial or model number. TOP authentication algo-
rithms are vulnerable to identity theft attacks since an adversary who
steals the secret key can generate valid passwords every time he wants
to establish a telemetry session with the device [34, 35, 42, 44, 21].
V2: Boundless telemetry session duration
The number of RF wake-up commands that a CIED can receive per
session is not limited, i.e. an attacker can maintain a telemetry session
indefinitely active by regularly sending the aforementioned commands
to prematurely reduce the CIED’s lifetime [22, 32, 42, 45].
V3: Unencrypted data storage and transmission
Certain CIED models store and transmit patient information without
encrypting it. Thus, a nearby attacker may intercept the data ex-
changed between the CIED and the programmer or even gain access to
the sensitive data stored on the device by sending an unauthorized RF
command [21, 34, 42, 46].
V4: Lack of command whitelisting techniques
Command whitelisting is a computer protection method based on soft-
ware restriction policy rules. This technique blocks by default the exe-
cution of all the programs contained in the device so that only programs
that are the subject of a policy rule can be executed. In the case of
CIED there are no policy rules prohibiting the execution of program-
ming commands from devices other than external programmers. Conse-
quently, an adversary could send a programming command to the CIED
by means of commercial available equipment such as a commercially-
available SDR [21, 22, 34].
V5: Unencrypted hardcoded authentication credentials
The product username and password are stored in a recoverable format,
i.e. without being previously encrypted [41, 47].
V6: Software directory path traversal
It has been shown that the software of certain devices contain directory
path traversal vulnerabilities, i.e. a kind of software implementation
vulnerability that permits the access to directories other than those
permitted by design. Thus, an adversary will be able to exploit these
weaknesses in order to read the external programmer’s file system [41,
48].
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V7: Improper Restriction of Communication Channel
Downloading software updates is done by means of a Virtual Private
Network (VPN) established between the programmer and its software
update provider. While the use of VPN is a recognized good practice to
secure communications between two parties, it has been unveiled that
certain external programmers models do not verify that they are still
connected to the VPN before the update operation is accomplished.
Thus, an adversary could leverage the device’s local network access
features to interfere with the communication between the programmer
and its software update provider [8, 41, 49].
V8: Exploiting embedded debugging interfaces (JTAG and UART)
Embedded debugging interfaces are connection ports present in a de-
vice’s printed circuits. Manufacturers use them to perform functional
testing and redesign of devices after manufacturing. For example,
JTAG is a master/server interface used to verify a circuit, test de-
vice logic and perform functional redesign when needed. It can be used
to read and modify the memory and the registers as well as to read the
device’s firmware. The UART interface provides a serial communica-
tion between the device’s embedded systems and an external PC, i.e. a
bidirectional interface used to send and receive data asynchronously.
Since these interfaces allow direct access to the device memory and
firmware, unprotected access to those interfaces constitutes an entry
point for attacks against the CIED [8]. Home monitoring devices also
have this vulnerability.
V9: Unprotected USB serial port connections
Certain devices have USB port connections. They are frequently used
by medical staff to store the information on a USB stick in order to
transfer it to other systems, e.g. reporting software. If the USB port
connection is not blocked with a password or another authentication
mechanism, an attacker could connect to it and access data on the
device and potentially take control of it[8].
V10: Unprotected removable media/hard-drives
When they are in the attacker’s hands, the media/hard drives become
an entry point of attacks since they can be used to extract information
from a device’s file system [8].
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V11: OS Hard coded authentication credentials
In certain products, authentication credentials to the operating system
(OS) are hard-coded on the device. That means that an adversary with
physical access to the device’s integrated circuit can access the OS by
connecting to the debug port and authenticate with the hard-coded
password [8, 43, 50].
V12: Exposed dangerous methods or functions
Home monitors contain debug code to test their communication inter-
faces with both the CIED or the external system (databases, servers) of
the cloud-based application used by the physicians. Thus, by leverag-
ing this vulnerability an adversary with physical access to the monitor
can maliciously exploit the debug code to accomplish a set of attacks,
for example, read or write the device’s memory content, interrupt the
data sending to the cloud-based systems, enable bidirectional commu-
nication with CIED [43, 51].
V13: Server hardcoded authentication credentials
The credentials that home monitors use to authenticate to the cloud-
based systems supporting the patient’s remote follow-up service are
hard-coded on certain devices. Thus, an attacker with physical access
to the monitor can leverage these vulnerabilities to access the database
in order to read or tamper with the patient’s medical data [8].
V14: Server hardcoded parameters
In certain home monitors the IP address of the authentication servers
are hard-coded. An adversary could use this information to conduct
a DoS attack to make the server temporarily unavailable by sending
several web requests to this IP address [8].
V15: Exploiting remote firmware update
Firmware updates for home monitors are triggered remotely. Indeed,
when the time comes to update the device’s firmware, the manufacturer
sends the new version to the monitor through the cloud. This method
is advantageous from the patient’s point of view since it avoids an
additional trip to the hospital. However, it constitutes at the same
time an attack vector because the home-monitoring device does not
verify the identity of the system distributing the firmware. An attacker
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could take advantage of this lack of verification by achieving a man-in-
the middle attack with the purpose of sending a counterfeit firmware
to the device [8].
6.2. Attack scenarios
Once we have identified who the actors are and what they are trying to
achieve (attack goals), we are now interested in the strategy that it is going
to be used by them, i.e. how will they exploit the vulnerabilities of the CIED
ecosystem to achieve their goals? Thus, as illustrated in Table 4, an attack
goal can be achieved through different scenarios. As defined in Section 4.2
an attack scenario is the sequence of events that must occur for the attack
to take place.
It can be noticed that the same scenario can serve to achieve different attack
goals. Since a threat is a pair (actor, scenario) and the actors can vary from
one attack goal to the next, we carried out the scenario-based risk analysis
by attack goals. The explanation of the scenarios of each attack goal follows.
For a more extensive description of the sequence of events leading to the
achievement of the attack scenarios refer to Appendix B.
G1 Access patient sensitive data
There are three ways to acquire patients medical data: performing a radio
attack (S1, S2) on the incoming RF communication between the CIED and
the external devices (monitor, programmer), getting unauthorized physical
access to the monitor contents (S3) or performing a network attack on the
monitor (S4).
Executing the radio attacks described in Scenarios S1 and S2 requires the ac-
tor to have specialized materials and software, namely an SDR, an antenna
and a radio signal processing software (e.g. GNURadio, HackRF, etc.). Once
this requirement has been met, the actor must go either to the patient’s home
(S1) or to the hospital(S2), place himself at a distance relatively close to the
CIED, configure its antenna in reception mode, tune it to the transmission
frequency of the CIED then, record the signals emitted by the latter and read
the patient’s medical data by exploiting the CIED unencrypted data storage
and transmission vulnerability (V3).
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Attack Scenario Scenario description Method
goal
G1 S1 CIED-Monitor communication interception Intercepting RF signals with an SDR
S2 CIED-Programmer communication interception Intercepting RF signals with an SDR
S3 Extraction of health data stored into the monitor Connecting to the debbugging ports
S4 Insertion of a backdoor (malware) into the monitor Performing MITM attack during a
firmware update session
G2 S4 Insertion of a backdoor (malware) into the monitor Performing a MITM attack during a
firmware update session
S5 Extraction of the programmer’s system data Sending a malicious http request
from the device’s SW deployment network server to the server
S6 Extraction of the programmer’s system data Accessing the device through an
update session communication channel
S7 Reading/extraction of the monitor file system Accessing the device USB port
S8 Reading/extraction of the programmer file system Accessing he device USB port
S9 Reading/extraction of the programmer system data Removing the media device hard drive
S10 Reading/extraction of the monitor OS information Connecting to the debugging ports
G3 S11 Insertion of a malware that produce programmer Performing a MITM attack during an
reading errors update session
S12 Introduction of calibration errors into the CIED Sending RF commands
microprocessor (through malware insertion or sending with an SDR
inappropriate commands)
S13 Insertion of a malware that produce programmer Using the device USB port
reading errors
G4 S4 Insertion of a ransomware (malware) into the monitor Performing a MITM attack during a
firmware update session
S11 Insertion of a ransomware (malware) into the programmer Performing a MITM attack during an
update session
S12 Insertion of a ransomware (malware) into the CIED Sending RF commands with an SDR
S14 Maintain CIED telemetry session open indefinitely Sending RF commands with an SDR
S15 Modify/erase the contents of the monitor memory Connecting to the debugging ports
G5 S11 Insertion of a malware that ignores programmer Performing a MITM attack during an
therapy settings update session
S11 Insertion of a malware that makes programmer Performing a MITM attack during
apply a predefined dangerous treatment update session
S11 Insertion of a backdoor (malware) into the programmer Performing a MITM attack during a
session update
S12 Modification of the CIED section of RAM containing Sending RF unauthorized commands
the therapy code to be applied to the patient with an SDR
G6 S10 Disable the periodic data transmission from the monitor Connecting to the debugging ports
S11 Insertion of a malware that produce programmer’s Performing a MITM attack during an
reading errors update session
S14 Maintain a CIED’s telemetry session indefinitely open Sending RF commands with an SDR
Table 4: Attack scenarios
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The physical attack of Scenario S3 also requires the actor to have specialized
equipment. An in-debugger-circuit, a debugger IDLE and a pirate bus (or
an F to F jumper wire) are needed. Since the monitor is the targeted device,
the actor must go to the patient home, then connect to the device’s debug-
ging interfaces employing the pirate bus (or the F to F jumper wire). After
that, he must use the in-debugger-circuit along with the debugger IDLE to
access the monitor’s memory content7. Consequently, the actor must ex-
ploit the following three vulnerabilities of the monitor: exploiting debugging
interfaces (V10), server hard-coded authentication credentials (V13) and, hard-
coded server parameters (V14).
The monitor is once again the target device in Scenario S4. Here, the network
attack proposed relies on installing a backdoor on the device. In this case,
the actor must know beforehand the day when an update will take place.
Once done, he must approach the patient’s home then, access the patient’s
private network, and achieve a man-in-the-middle attack exploiting the mon-
itor’s remote firmware update session (V15). At that point, the actor must
swap the updated firmware for a backdoor. Thus, he will be able to access
the target at any later time employing the backdoor.
G2 Gain knowledge of device operation and software
G2 can be achieved by performing network attacks on the external devices
(S4, S6, S7, or S8), launching a web attack on the programmer software de-
ployment network server (S5), or getting unauthorized physical access to the
external devices (S9, S10). In the last case we will talk about a physical
attack on the external devices.
For the network attacks of Scenarios S4, S6, S7, and S8, the actor must either
go to the patient’s home (S4, S7) or the hospital (S6, S8). Note that for Sce-
narios S4 and S7, this must occur the day of an update of the monitor and the
programmer respectively. Once on the crime scene, the actor should access
either the targeted device network (S7, S8) or the communication channel
established between the communicating parties (S4, S6). In the last case,
7This attack scenario will be used especially when the ultimate goal of the attacker
would be to subsequently attack the server to obtain the medical data of several patients.
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the communicating parties are the external device and the web server of the
entity in charge of the updates. Thus, once in the external device network
the actor should either connect himself to the USB port and acquire the file
system (S7, S8) or have direct access to the devices and therefore to the data
(S4, S6).
In Scenario S5 the actor must find the URL from which the programmer
update application retrieve files from the server of the software deployment
network. Once this is done, he modifies the URL with commands and web
server escape code. After that, he sends this URL to the web server by means
of a web request. Thus, if the attack is successful, the actor will be able to
extract the desired files.
Getting an unauthorized physical access to the external devices (S9 and S10)
is another mean to achieve G2. On Scenario S9, the extraction of the pro-
grammer hard drive is required. Thus, the actor should go to the hospital
and remove it. As far as Scenario S10 is concerned the attack is on the mon-
itor, that is to say that the crime scene is the patient’s home. The sequence
of events of this scenario is that of S3 except that two events are added,
namely 1) connect to the debug port of the operating system and then 2)
authenticate using the credentials that will have been previously acquired by
performing the same actions as in S3.
G3 Induce medical staff to make diagnostic errors
G3 can be achieved is feasible by achieving three kinds of attacks: a network
attack on the programmer (S11), a radio attack on the CIED (S12) or a phys-
ical attacks on the programmer (S13).
The sequence of events for Scenario S11 is practically the same as that for
Scenario S4. What differentiates both scenarios is the target device. In S4,
it is the monitor while in S11, it is the programmer. Thus the only difference
between S11 and S4 stems from the first event, that in the case of S11 is
happening in the patient’s home.
Scenario S12 is completely similar to Scenarios S1 and S2. The only change
is the actor’s behavior. Indeed, in Scenarios S1 and S2 he intercepts data;
he is a passive actor. In Scenario S12, however, he transmits data, thus he
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is an active actor. The events in Scenario S12 are otherwise practically the
same events as in S1 and S2. We say practically because first, a new event is
added. That is the transmission of data. Second, one of the events of S1 and
S2 is modified. In fact we saw for the G1 scenario the actor would have to
configure his antenna in reception mode to intercept the data, while in S12
it will have to put in transmission mode.
In Scenario S13 a network attack is performed on the programmer. The
actor’s purpose here is to introduce a calibration error on the device, by in-
serting a malware through the device’s UBS port connection. In order to do
so, he goes to the patient’s home, accesses the patient’s network, scans the
network ports in order to find the one that corresponds to the USB connec-
tion, then sends the malware by means of the aforementioned port. As it can
be noticed, the sequence of events for Scenario S13 is quite similar Scenario
S8. The difference between both is the last event which in S8 is accessing the
device file system while in S13 it is sending the malware.
G4 Disrupt or lower quality of patient follow-up
The goals of G4 can be accomplised by performing a network attack against
the external devices (S4, S11), radio attacks against the CIED (S12, S14) or
physical attack against the monitor.
In the first cases, i.e. Scenarios S4 and S11, the purpose of the attack is to
render the data of the external devices unreadable. To do this, the actor will
send a ransomware to the devices, i.e. a kind of malware that encrypts the
system data. Data restoration consists of applying the same operation to the
encrypted data with decryption key. Normally, the malware operator will
have generated and kept secret a copy of the decryption key, that will only
be revealed to the victim in exchange for ransom. The sequence of the events
is similar to that of S4 and S11 for the G1 and G2 scenarios. The difference
lies in the type of malware used, and this has no effect on the sequence of
events.
For the radio attacks, the sequence of events leading to S12 because is similar
to that in G3. What changes between the two attacks goals is the nature of
the data transmitted by the actor. In G3, it is a dangerous command, here
it is malware. Scenario S14 consists off periodically sending wake-up com-
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mands to the CIED to maintain open the incoming wireless communication.
In order to do that, the actor must obtain an SDR, an antenna and a signal
processing software. He must track the victim and replay an RF wake-up
command every time the wireless session is about to expire.
G5 Alter device behaviour to endanger patient
G5 is achievable by perpetrating network attacks on the programmer (S11).
These attacks can take several forms as detailed in the Table 4. Indeed, the
actor can implement these scenarios to send malicious code that ignores the
therapy settings set by the practitioners, or introduces a calibration error
into the device, or allows him to access the device by means of a backdoor.
Performing a radio attack against the CIED (S12) is another way to accom-
plish the Goal G5. The actor’s purpose here will be to modify the device’s
RAM section containing the therapy code to be applied to the patient. As
those scenarios have already been appearing in previous attacks goals sce-
narios (G3 and G4), the event sequence will be the same.
G6 Alter device behaviour to decrease quality of life
Three kinds of attacks can be carried out in order to achieve attack Goal G6.
The first one, S10, consists in perpetrating a physical attack on the monitor
with the purpose of disabling the device’s periodic data transmission. The
second one, S11, relies on the execution of a network attack on the program-
mer. The actor introduces a calibration error on the device by inserting
malware. The third one, S14, is a radio attack on the CIED. The goal will
be to maintain a wireless communication session indefinitely open by send-
ing RF wake-up commands. The event sequence is similar to that of Goal G5.
6.3. Probabilities of Occurrence
As defined in Section 4.2, the probability of occurrence (Pr) represents the
chance that a given threat (actor-scenario pair) materializes. In other words,
it is the likelihood that an actor achieves an attack scenario with success.
By success we mean the achievement of the attack’s goal or what is the
same, the engendering of a specific impact on the victim. We calculate the
probability by threat. That is, for each actor of each scenario. As explained
in the methodology section (Section 4.3), Pr is calculated (1) as the sum
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of the three threat attributes: capacity (c), opportunity (o) and motivation
(m). The c, o, m values vary from 1 to 4, with 4 corresponding to a higher
likelihood. In the following paragraphs, we justify the rates assigned to c, o,
m for each threat, with the overall Pr values given in Table 5.
6.3.1. Attack goal G1
Capacity. Scenarios S1 and S2 are accomplished by means of radio attacks.
The capacit for Actors A3 and A4 are the same (c = 3) for many reasons:
the knowledge is abundant and accessible to all the actors, the software tools
used to intercept and process RF signals are increasingly simpler to use,
thus reducing the attack’s technical difficulty, and the equipment needed to
perform these attacks (SDR and antenna) is not expensive. For Scenario S3,
even if the knowledge is accessible to all the actors and the equipment needed
to conduct the attack is not expensive, the attack is technically complex
to achieve. Indeed, it involves the exploitation of two vulnerabilities for
which solid knowledge of computer programming and architecture is required.
Normally, Actor A3 recruits experts with exceptional technical skills and have
more human resources. They have more capacity than Actor A4. Thus, in
Scenario S3 A3 capacity (c = 2) is higher than the one of Actor A4 (c = 1).
Scenario S4 is a network attack and thus additional material is not required.
Additionally, there is nowadays extensive information available and tools to
perform the attack in S4 . Thus, capacity for Actors A3 and A4 will be the
same (c = 3) in this scenario.
Opportunity. In Scenarios S1 and S3, the attack takes place in the patient’s
home. In these cases Actor A3 (o = 2) has a better chance than Actor A4
(o = 1) since they are specifically trained to infiltrate private sites without
being noticed. In Scenario S2, the attack takes place in the hospital during a
patient’s medical visit. The latter implies that adversaries only have approx-
imately two days a year to conduct the attack, coinciding with the number of
times patients go to the doctor. However, since hospitals are public places,
the actors are less likely to be noticed. Thus, the opportunity score for Ac-
tors A3 and A4 (o = 2) is the same. In Scenario S4 the attacks take place
during a monitor’s update session, which takes place only about once a year.
Actor A3 access to this information and opportunity to leverage it is greater
(o = 2) than that of Actor A4 (o = 1).
Motivation. Both Actors A3 and A4 benefit from the crime. They gain access
to sensitive personal information. For A3, this attack objective is in line with
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Attack Scenario actor c o m Pr
goal
G1 S1 A3 3 2 2 7
A4 3 1 1 5
S2 A3 3 2 2 7
A4 3 2 1 6
S3 A3 2 2 2 6
A4 1 1 1 3
S4 A3 3 2 2 7
A4 3 1 1 5
G2 S4 A1 4 1 2 7
A2 3 2 4 9
A3 3 2 3 8
A4 3 1 3 7
S5 A1 4 3 2 9
A2 4 3 4 11
A3 4 3 3 10
A4 3 3 3 9
S6 A1 4 1 2 7
A2 3 2 4 9
A3 3 2 3 8
A4 3 1 3 7
S7 A1 4 2 2 8
A2 3 3 4 10
A3 3 3 3 9
A4 3 2 3 8
S8 A1 4 3 2 9
A2 3 3 4 10
A3 3 3 3 9
A4 3 3 3 9
S9 A1 4 1 1 6
A2 4 2 1 7
A3 4 2 1 7
A4 4 1 1 6
S10 A1 1 1 1 3
A2 2 2 1 5
A3 2 2 1 5
A4 1 1 1 3
Attack Scenario actor c o m Pr
goal
G3 S11 A1 4 1 1 6
A3 3 2 3 8
A4 3 1 3 7
S12 A1 1 1 1 3
A3 2 2 3 7
A4 2 1 3 6
S13 A1 4 3 1 8
A3 3 3 3 9
A4 3 3 3 9
G4 S4 A1 3 1 1 5
A3 2 2 3 7
A4 2 1 2 5
S11 A1 3 1 1 5
A3 2 2 3 7
A4 2 1 2 5
S12 A1 3 1 1 5
A3 2 2 3 7
A4 2 1 2 5
S14 A1 3 1 1 5
A3 3 2 2 7
A4 3 1 3 6
S15 A1 1 1 1 3
A3 3 2 3 8
A4 2 1 2 5
G5 S11(a) A3 3 2 2 7
A4 3 1 3 6
S11(b) A3 2 2 2 6
A4 1 1 3 5
S11(c) A3 3 2 2 7
A4 3 1 3 7
S12 A3 2 2 2 6
A4 2 1 3 6
G6 S10 A1 1 1 1 3
A3 2 2 3 7
A4 1 1 3 5
S11 A1 4 1 1 6
A3 3 2 3 8
A4 3 1 3 7
S14 A1 3 1 1 5
A3 3 2 3 8
A4 3 1 3 6
Table 5: Probability of occurrence of identified threats
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the raison d’tre of their profession, i.e. obtaining private information from
individuals. Thus the motivation of Actor A3 (m = 2) will be higher than
that of Actor A4 (m =1) because for A3 this attack objective is an end in
itself while for A4 it is a means to an end (sow national disorder).
6.3.2. Attack goal G2
Capacity. In Scenario S5 a web attack is launched. There is information
and tools available online to perform this kind of attack. Actor type A4 are
experts in the field (web attack). On the other hand, Actors A2 and A3
are specialists in the extraction of information from people or systems. In
addition, they often have specialized human resources. Thus the capacity
of A1, A2 and A3 (c = 4) is the same and it is higher than that of A4
(c = 3). In Scenarios S4, S6, S7 and S8 network attacks are conducted.
Once more, information and tools are available to achieve these attacks.
However, because they have more know-how than the others on the matter
(i.e. network attacks) Actor A4’s capacity (c = 4) is higher than that of A1,
A2 and A3 (c = 3). The attack performed in S9 has no major technical
complications. It is necessary to remove a hard disk and then mount it
later in another computer media. Thus, the capacity of all actors will be
the same (c = 4). However, the achievement of Scenario S10 presents a
major challenge. On the one hand, solid technical knowledge of computer
programming and architecture is necessary. In addition, there is no extensive
information about how to realize the exploit in S10 . Thus, Actors A2 and
A4’s capacity (c = 2) is higher than that of A1 and A4 (c = 1) since A2
and A3 normally are experts with exceptional technical skills and have more
human resources.
Opportunity. Scenario S5 is a web attack where there is no restriction of time
and space. So the actors’ opportunity will be higher and the same (o = 3).
Scenarios S6 and S4 take place during targeted device update sessions, during
which there are constraints in terms of time (update session) and space (near
the patient’s home or hospital). As far as the time constraint is concerned,
Actors A2 and A3 have better possibilities to know when an update session
will take place. In terms of space constraint, A2 and A3 have the same
opportunities either at the patient’s home or in the hospital. However, A1
and A4 will have more chances in the hospital as this is a public place where
they can go unnoticed. Thus on the S6 and S4 Scenarios, Actors A2 and
A3 opportunity is higher (o = 2) than that of A1 and A4 (o = 1). For
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Scenarios S7, S8, S9 and S10 there is no time constraint but there is still a
space constraint. Scenarios S7 and S8 require the actor to be near either the
patient’s home or the hospital in order to access their network, whereas for
S9 and S10 the actor must to have physical access to the targeted devices.
Similarly as for S7, since the attack takes place near to patient’s home Actors
A2 and A3 opportunity (o = 3) will be higher than the one of Actors A1
and A4 (o = 2). For S8 however, all actors opportunity score is the same
(o = 3) since the attack takes place in a public site. In Scenarios S9 and
S10, since the attack requires physical access to the device Actors A2 and A3
opportunity (o = 2) is higher tan that of A1 and A4 (o = 1).
Motivation. All actors benefit from the crime. They gain system information.
A2 motivation (m = 4) is the highest since the goal of this attack is the
purpose of their profession. Actors A3 and A4 follow them with the same level
of motivation (m = 3). The motivation of A1 (m=2) is the lowest because
obtaining system information is not an end but a means to accomplish their
activities.
6.3.3. Attack goal G3
Capacity. Attack scenarios S11, S12 and S13 consist in introducing reading or
calibration errors on the CIED’s ecosystems devices. To do that knowledge
of the device inner workings and advanced programming skills are required.
Since there is some but not a lot of available information about how pro-
grammers and monitors work, in Scenarios S11 and S13 the capacity of A1
(c = 4) will be higher than that of A3 and A4 (c = 3). The reason is that A1
are experts in the development of malicious code. On the other hand, there
is much less information available about CIED and their architecture. Thus,
for Scenario S12, the capacity of the actors will be the same (c = 2). This is
due to the fact that while A1 are experts in malware development, A3 and
A4 are more likely to obtain the CIED’s mode of operation either by hiring
personnel skilled in CIED programming or by using other illegal methods.
Opportunity. For Scenarios S11 and S12 there are constraints in terms of time
and space. Scenario S11 takes place in the hospital during a session update.
Scenario S12 must be performed near the patient and during an incoming
wireless communication with one of the externals devices. In these scenarios,
we apply the same opportunity values that we have applied to the scenarios
S6 and S4. That is to say that in S11 and S12, Actor A3’s opportunity (o = 2)
is higher than that of Actors A1 and A4 (o = 1). On S13 there is only a space
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restriction, and the same reasoning as in Scenario S8 is applied: all actors
have the same opportunity (o = 3).
Motivation. Actors A1, A3 and A4 all benefit from the attack. Actor A1
conducts these attacks in order to make money, whereas Actors A3 and A4
are motivated by the opportunity to cause harm. Thus, Actors A3 and A4’s
motivation is the same (m = 3) and higher than that of Actor A1 (m = 1)
since for the latter there are other ways to make more money faster.
6.3.4. Attack goal G4
Capacity. In Scenario S14 a replay attack is performed. There is no major
challenge in conducting this attack, which consists in periodically transmit-
ting a Wake-Up command to the CIED by means of an SDR. Thus Actors
A1, A3 and A4’s capacity is the same (c = 3). However, in Scenarios S12,
S11 and S4, Actor A1’s capacity is higher (c = 3) than that of A3 and A4
(c = 2), since these scenarios consist in implanting a ransomware, and A1 are
experts on malicious code development. For Scenario S15 advanced knowl-
edge in computer programming and architecture is needed. Thus, Actor A3’s
capacity (c = 3) will be higher because they have more human resources and
specialized personnel, followed by, Actors A4 (c = 2) and A1 (c = 1).
Opportunity. In Scenarios S14 and S12 there are still constraints in terms of
time and space. The actor must be close to the patient in order to send
radio commands with its antenna to the CIED . Moreover, the attack must
take place while the wireless communication is established in the CIED. As
in the other scenarios where these constraints are presents, the opportunity
of Actor A3 (o = 2) is always higher than that of Actors A1 and A4 (o = 1).
In Scenarios S4 and S11, the situation is the same, the actor being limited by
space (home or hospital) and time (update sessions). Normally, when there
is only a space constraint all actors have the same opportunity at the hospital
(S11) because it is a public place and, while Actor A3 has more opportunity
at home (S4). However, since in Scenario S11 there is the additional the
time constraint that it happens during an update session, the actors oppor-
tunity will be the same in both scenarios. Thus, in Scenarios S11 and S4
the opportunity of A3 (o = 2) is higher than that of A1 and A4 (o = 1).
In Scenario S15, physical access to the targeted system, i.e. the monitor, is
required. Thus, the opportunity for Actor A3 (o = 2) is higher than that of
A1 and A4 (o = 1).
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Motivation. Actors A1, A3 and A4 all benefit from the attack. By perform-
ing these attack scenarios, A3 (m = 2) and A4 (m = 3) would succeed in
endangering patients’ lives and consequently harming their quality of life,
while A1 (m = 1) would make money through ransom.
6.3.5. Attack goal G5
Capacity. Since there is extensive information about the external program-
mer behaviour, the capacity of Actors A3 and A4 (c = 3) is the same on
Scenarios S11(a) and S11(c) . For Scenario S11(b) knowledge of Cardiology is
required, and Actor A3 is more likely to have access to personnel with such
knowlegde or hiring it. Thus, A3’s capacity (c = 2) is higher than that of
A4 (c = 1). On Scenario S12, the capacity of the Actors A3 and A4 will be
the same (c = 2). The reasoning is the same as that for Scenario S12 (Sec-
tion 6.3.3), namely the lack of information concerning the CIED’s behaviour
and implementation.
Opportunity. The analyis of the opportunity factor for Scenario S14 (Sec-
tion 6.3.4) apply equally to Scenario S12. Thus, the opportunity of A3 (o = 2)
is higher than that of A4 (o = 1). The same is true for the analysis of op-
portunity for Scenario S11 on Attack Goal G3 (Section 6.3.3), which applies
to Scenarios S11(a), S11(b) and S11(c). That is to say that the opportunity of
A3 (o = 2) is higher than that of A4 (o = 1).
Motivation. This attack goal clearly aims at harming the health of an indi-
vidual. Thus it is Actor A3 (m = 2) and Actor A4 (m = 3) that benefit
most from this attack. We do not give them maximum motivation because
there are many faster and equally subtle ways to achieve this goal.
6.3.6. Attack goal G6
For Scenario S10 the analysis made in Section 6.3.2 in terms of capacity and
opportunity equally applies. For Scenarios S11 and S14, the capacity and
opportunity socres are the same as those of Section 6.3.3 and 6.3.4,n respec-
tively. In terms of motivation the same reasoning than for Attack Goal G3
(6.3.3) is applied.
6.4. Combined risk assessment
Risk assessment values range between 3 and 48. They are calculated as the
probability (ranging from 3 to 12) multiplied by the impact (from 1 to 4).
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Risk level Values Management strategy
– Unacceptable R=[36,48] Refuse
– Undesirable R=[24,35] Manage
– Acceptable R=[12,23] Accept
– Negligeable R=[3,11] Accept
Table 6: Risk characterization
We calculate the risk separately for each impact category. This way of doing
things gives insight of the risk that each threat (scenario, actor) represents
separately for the health, economy, quality of life and privacy impact cate-
gories. Consequently, this analysis responds to the needs of several different
groups such as medical practitioners, regulators, manufacturers and even pa-
tients. Each will know what the riskiest threat is for him and therefore the
one to treat with priority. We ranked the risks in Table 6. Depending on the
risk value, different risk management strategies can be chosen and applied.
There are four strategies for managing risk, namely refuse, accept, transfer
or manage the risk. The most drastic is of course to refuse the risk, which
is when the risk is considered unacceptable because of the catastrophic con-
sequences it may have on the victims. In those cases, it is recommended to
prohibit, stop using or remove the system posing the threat. The strategy of
accepting the risk is applied when the risk is either negligible or acceptable.
That is to say when the benefits that the system bring outweigh its potential
risks. Transfering the risk relies on giving the risk management responsibility
to a third party such as an insurance company. This is a strategy that is
not really applicable in those threats where the impact is on patient health
or quality of life. Finally, the risk mitigation or risk management strategy
consists in reducing the risk as much as possible with available means. This
can be done through the updates of the systems, stricter regulations or even
awareness campaigns.
7. Results and Discussion
The attacks goals of inducing medical staff to make errors (G3) and alter
device behavior to endanger patient (G5) represent a risk for patient health.
Those to gain knowledge of device operation and software (G2), induce medi-
cal staff to make errors (G3) and disrupt or lower quality of patient follow-up
(G4) represent an economic risk to manufacturers and health organizations.
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We can then note that G3 represents a risk for all groups. In terms of privacy
or degradation of life quality, none of the attack goals represent a potential
risk that needs to be managed. In this section, we focus on those threats
representing either an unacceptable or an undesirable risk for the victims’
health and economy. The risk results of all the threats herein considered can
be found in Table 6 of Appendix A.
7.1. Monetary risk assessment
7.1.1. Monetary risk assessment by attack goals
Attack goal G2. This attack goal represents a major risk in terms of eco-
nomic losses. The victim can be either the manufacturer or the hospital. As
hospitals are public organization, it can be considered that it is the whole
society that is the victim. G2 contains five unacceptable threats (Scenarios
S4, S5, S6, S7 and S8 with all actors). These threats should be managed with
high priority. By analyzing these threats, we can see that the actor’s attack
method is always the same, namely exploiting the authentication mechanisms
of the target systems, i.e. the external devices and cloud-based systems with
which they interact. This fact in itself is good news. On the one hand, exter-
nal devices are not constrained by the resource limitations as the CIED are,
so robust authentication solutions can be implemented without significant
problems. There is a plethora of standard robust and proven solutions to
secure system authentication, and there is no need to resort to proprietary,
unproven solutions. We, therefore, propose the following solutions.
The threats related to Scenario S4 are solved by securing domestic networks.
To do this, patients must take the habit of securing their network with a
robust password, e.g. a password containing upper and lower case charac-
ters, numbers and special characters. This password should be periodically
changed. Also, the patient should pay attention to the other Internet of
Things (IOT) devices that are connected to his network, as they can be the
entry door to their network. Accordingly, they should ensure that all devices
in their networks are secured with a password.
To solve the threats associated with Scenario S5, it is essential to insist that
web developers use good code practices and that the source code of web pages
be periodically reviewed.
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To mitigate the threats associated with Scenario S6, hospitals and manufac-
turers should adopt more reliable VPN solutions even if they require more
investment. Besides, hospitals and manufacturers should consider recruiting
cybersecurity professionals and technical services whose responsibility will
be to ensure that there are no cybersecurity threats in their systems and/or
networks, including those used for CIED programming and management.
For the threats associated with Scenarios S7 and S8, the solution involves
securing USB ports of monitors and programmers with robust passwords,
which should be continuously modified.
The threat posed by Scenario S9 is not as significant. This means that it
must be managed. The solution is simple: physical security of the targets de-
vices, in this case, programmers. In addition, it would be necessary to carry
out awareness campaigns among the staff who use those devices, so that they
become aware of the scope of the problem and therefore more attentive to
the physical security of these devices.
Attack goal G3. The threats associated with the scenarios S11 and S13 rep-
resent an undesirable risk. In order to mitigate the first threat, hospitals and
manufacturers should adopt more reliable VPN solutions. The mitigation of
the second threat involves securing the USB ports of the programmers with
robust passwords.
Attack goal G4. The threat related to Scenario S10 represents an undesir-
able risk whose mitigation is to protect the debugging interface ports with a
password.
7.1.2. Monetary risk assessment by attack vectors
From an economic point of view, the vulnerabilities V6, V7, V9, and V15 must
be eliminated, because their exploitation constitutes an unacceptable risk for
the hospitals and the manufacturers. V6 is eliminated by using good program-
ming practices and revising the source code of the programmers’ software.
V7 by securing hospital networks, and adopting more reliable VPN solutions.
The security of hospital networks can also be improved by implementing effi-
cient identity and access management (IAM) rules. For V9, it is necessary to
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Risk level Management strategy
– Unacceptable Refuse
– Undesirable Manage
– Acceptable Accept
– Negligeable Accept
Attack goal Scenario Attack vector PrMax I R
G1 Access patients sensitive data S1 3 7 1 7
S2 3 7 1 7
S3 10,13,14 6 1 6
S4 15 7 1 7
G2 Gain Knowledge of device operation and software S4 15 9 4 36
S5 6 11 4 44
S6 7 9 4 36
S7 9 10 4 40
S8 9 10 4 40
S9 8 7 4 28
S10 10,11,12 5 4 20
G3 Induce medical staff to make errors S11 7 8 3 24
S12 1,4,5 7 3 21
S13 9 9 3 27
G4 Disrupt or lower quality of patient follow-up S4 15 7 3 21
S11 7 7 3 21
S12 1,4,5 7 3 21
S14 2 7 3 21
S15 10 8 3 24
G5 Alter device behavior to endanger patient S11(a) 7 7 3 21
S11(b) 7 6 3 18
S11(c) 7 7 3 21
S12 1,4,5 6 3 18
G6 Alter device behavior to decrease quality of life S10 10,11,12 7 2 14
S11 7 8 2 16
S14 2 8 2 16
Table 7: Results of the monetary risk assessment
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secure the USB ports of the external devices with strong passwords. Finally,
securing home networks with strong passwords would eliminate the vulner-
ability V15. Once the vulnerabilities mentioned above have been addressed,
vulnerability V8 must be managed as a priority because its exploitation con-
stitutes an undesirable risk for hospitals. To do that, they must ensure the
physical security of the programmer devices.
7.2. Health risk assessment
7.2.1. Health risk assessment by attack goals
Attack goal G3. The results of Table 8 reveal that G3 is the riskiest attack
goal in terms of health. This is because of the unacceptable risk that Scenario
S13 represents, i.e. the insertion of malware on the programmer through a
USB port connection aimed to generate reading errors. Among the riskiest
threats of this attack goal, this one must be managed with priority. However,
the solution is simple: protect USB port connection with a robust password
and frequently change this password. During our observation of operations
in a pacemaker clinic, we observed that it is common practice for staff to
record the readings of the programmer (during follow-up sessions) in a USB
key and then insert the key into a medical report formatting software in a
separate computer system. We recommend that staff pay attention because
this USB key could be the target of the actors. They could install the mal-
ware on it, and it would infect the programmer. Secondly, the computer
where the software is located could also be the target of the actor. This
means that the actor could infect the computer, subsequently the computer
would infect the USB key, and then the programmer. Thus, it is necessary
to pay attention to who is using the USB key, and then to ensure that the
computer containing the report formatting software is itself secure (e.g. not
connected to the network, unless strictly necessary).
The threats related to Attack Scenarios S11 and S12 constitute an undesir-
able risk that need to be mitigated. For Scenario S11, the threat consists in
the insertion of malware into the programmer. S11 is achievable by accessing
the device network during the programmer update session. The threat, as
mentioned above, is avoidable by securing the health center network. Accord-
ingly, it is necessary to implement an efficient method of identity and access
management (IAM) of the computer systems of those entities. On the other
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hand, S12 threat takes advantage of the improper restriction of communica-
tion channels during the programmer updates. As mentioned in Section 6.1,
those updates are achieved through a VPN between the device and the entity
in charge of the updates. Thus, the health centers and manufacturers must
invest in reliable solutions of VPN. For Scenario S12, the threat is the inser-
tion of malware on the CIED. This threat is due to the lack of robustness
of the CIED authentication mechanisms. One potentital solution consists in
implementing more robust authentication mechanisms by using well-known
techniques (e.g. asymmetric cryptography). However, CIED are limited in
terms of computing resources and such solutions are not the most appro-
priate. There are, however, other more adequate solutions, which could be
applied during the CIED manufacturing process. In particular, we propose
that manufacturers use whitelisting techniques in the CIED software, which
would prevent devices other than the programmer from sending commands
to the CIED.
Attack goal G5. As in Attack Goal G3, the achievement of Scenarios S11
and S12 constitutes undesirable risk that must be managed. The same rec-
ommendations made for G3 therefore also apply here.
7.2.2. Health risk assessment by attack vectors
From a health point of view, vulnerability V9 must be eliminated because
its exploitation represents an unacceptable risk to the health of individuals.
This is feasible by securing the USB ports of the external devices with strong
passwords. Once V9 is adequately managed, Vulnerabilities V6, V7 and V5
must be managed as a priority because their exploitation constitutes an un-
desirable risk. To mitigate the risk that V6 represents, good programming
practices and code source revision must take place on the programmer soft-
ware. To reduce the risk associated with V7, the hospital networks must be
secured, and reliable VPN solutions must be applied. Finally, to mitigate V5
it is necessary to apply whitelisting techniques on the CIED.
8. Conclusion
As evidenced by previous work, CIED are vulnerable to cyber attacks that
use their RF interfaces to communicate with external devices (programmer
44
Risk level Management strategy
– Unacceptable Refuse
– Undesirable Manage
– Acceptable Accept
– Negligeable Accept
Attack goal Scenario Attack vector PrMax I R
G3 Induce medical staff to make errors S11 7 8 4 32
S12 1,4,5 7 4 28
S13 9 9 4 36
G4 Disrupt or lower quality of patient follow-up S4 15 7 2 14
S11 7 7 2 14
S12 1,4,5 7 2 14
S14 2 7 2 14
S15 10 8 2 16
G5 Alter device behavior to endanger patient S11(a) 7 7 4 28
S11(b) 7 6 4 24
S11(c) 7 7 4 28
S12 1,4,5 6 4 24
Table 8: Results of the health risk assessment
and home monitor). This fact has been proven by the realization of radio at-
tacks against the CIED RF communication interface in research laboratories
[21, 22]. Additionally, the telemetry functionality of the externals devices
introduces vectors of cyber attacks [8]. Those can include manipulation of
the home monitor, interception of transmissions from the home monitor to
the cloud and the physician’s station, and manipulation of the cloud-based
database itself. Although the vulnerabilities mentioned above exist, no at-
tacks have been reported until now in real life, i.e. in an environment other
than the controlled environment of research laboratories.
Thus, it remained to be determined how viable such an attack would be on
an actual target (person or device) in the real world. This led us to the
following research question: What are the real risks of cyber attacks onto
CIED and the systems they depend on (programmer, monitor, cloud-based
systems)? To answer this question, we carried out a realistic risk analysis of
such attacks, with regards to their impact at four scales: health, economy,
quality of life and privacy. We proceeded in this way because the problem
under study affects many different groups namely: patients, practitioners,
manufacturers, and more broadly states. Accordingly, separating the scales
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aims to individually support those groups objectives in terms of risk man-
agement.
We did three kinds of analysis. First, an actor-based risk analysis to de-
termine who the actors are and what their attack goals are. This analysis
allowed us to determine the level of impact of the attacks. We then made a
scenario-based risk analysis to determine the probability of occurrence of the
attacks. Finally, we performed a combined risk analysis by considering the
impact and probability results. We determined the most dangerous attack
goals on the one hand, and the most dangerous vulnerabilities on the other.
Our work reveals that the vulnerabilities associated with the RF communi-
cation interface of CIED represents an acceptable risk. This is due to the
fact that these vulnerabilities have a low probability of being successfully
exploited in real conditions (environment other than a research laboratory).
However, the network and Internet connectivity of external devices represents
a risk that in some cases is unacceptable, i.e. a risk that must be absolutely
refused. The answer to our research question is therefore that the real risk
is in the external devices and not in the CIED and that this risk is due
to the increasing connectivity of said devices. We can therefore see that
the problem under study is the medical variant of the trendy cyber-security
problem: the lack of security of connected objects (Internet of Thing or IOT).
Indeed, among the 15 vulnerabilities identified, four constitute an unaccept-
able risk. They are V6, V7, V9, and V15 and are all to external devices. Five
other vulnerabilities (V1, V4, V5, V8, andV10) represent an undesirable risk,
i.e. a risk that must be addressed. Among the latter two are vulnerabilities
specific to CIED (V1,V4). However, their exploitation will have an impact if
and only if another specific programmer vulnerability is successfully exploited
(V5). There are already existing solutions to avoid all those vulnerabilities.
The parties involved have to put them into practice. In order to achieve this,
stronger regulation and legislation is needed. These should not be limited to
good practice guidelines without any force of law as is the case today. In the
same manner, the FDA or Health Canada (or other similar national organi-
zations) should impose that hardware components of medical equipment pass
a set of certification tests including cyber security assessment in order to be
accepted in the market; the same should be the case for their software com-
ponents. Finally, the various involved parties (practionners, patients, etc.)
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should be duly informed of the origin, nature and scope of the threats and
how to protect themselves at their level. This information must be disclosed
in language that is understandable to them so that they can take part in the
solution.
Moreover, our analysis revealed that the attack goals (G2) Gain knowledge of
device operation and software and (G3) Induce medical staff to make errors
are the main attack goals of the actors. This result shows that while attacks
on these devices affect patients, the patients are not always the target as
we may have thought so far. The targets in many cases are manufacturers
(intellectual property theft) and practitioners (threat of civil liability) for
purely economic reasons. Manufacturers should, therefore, be aware of the
problem and focus on the computer security of their equipment. The first
step to this is avoiding secrecy regarding the software and architecture of
their equipment. As has been often posited, code is more secure when it is
open source since several people can test it and report errors so that they
can be patched. This secrecy about code instead of protecting manufactur-
ers, exposes them more to cyber security risk. Health centers have to become
more selective and demanding with the equipment they buy and implant on
patients, as this would allow them to put more pressure on manufacturers to
make the right cyber security choices.
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Appendix A. Risk assessment by attack goals and impact type
— Unacceptable risk
— Undesirable risk
— Acceptable risk
— Negligeable risk
H M LQ P
Attack goal Scenario Attack vector PrMax I R I R I R I R
G1 S1 3 7 - - 1 7 - - 2 14
S2 3 7 - - 1 7 - - 2 14
S3 10,13,14 6 - - 1 6 - - 2 12
S4 15 7 - - 1 7 - - 2 14
G2 S4 15 9 - - 4 36 - - - -
S5 6 11 - - 4 44 - - - -
S6 7 9 - - 4 36 - - - -
S7 9 10 - - 4 40 - - - -
S8 9 10 - - 4 40 - - - -
S9 8 7 - - 4 28 - - - -
S10 10,11,12 5 - - 4 20 - - - -
G3 S11 7 8 4 32 3 24 1 8 - -
S12 1,4,5 7 4 28 3 21 1 7 - -
S13 9 9 4 36 3 27 1 9 - -
G4 S4 15 7 2 14 3 21 1 7 - -
S11 7 7 2 14 3 21 1 7 - -
S12 1,4,5 7 2 14 3 21 1 7 - -
S14 2 7 2 14 3 21 1 7 - -
S15 10 8 2 16 3 24 1 8 - -
G5 S11(a) 7 7 4 28 3 21 - - - -
S11(b) 7 6 4 24 3 18 - - - -
S11(c) 7 7 4 28 3 21 - - - -
S12 1,4,5 6 4 24 3 18 - - - -
G6 S10 10,11,12 7 - - 2 14 2 14 - -
S11 7 8 - - 2 16 2 16 - -
S14 2 8 - - 2 16 2 16 - -
Table A.9: Risk assessment results
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Appendix B. Sequence of events of the attack scenarios
S1 : Radio attack on the CIED-Programmer wireless communications.
(e1)Acquire the hardware (SDR, antenna, signal processing software)
(e2)Go to the hospital
(e3)Be located at a distance relatively close to the CIED
(e4)Configure the SDR in reception mode
(e5) Perform a frequency scan of the MICS band to determine the transmis-
sion frequency of the CIED
(e6) Intercept and record the signal transmitted by the CIED
(e7)Read the patients health data (V3)
S2 : Radio attack on the CIED-Monitor wireless communications.
(e1)Acquire the hardware (SDR, antenna, signal processing software).
(e2)Go to the patient’s home
(e3)Be located at a distance relatively close to the CIED
(e4)Configure the SDR in reception mode
(e5) Perform a frequency scan of the MICS band to determine the transmis-
sion frequency of the CIED
(e6)Intercept and record the signal transmitted by the CIED
(e7) Read the patients health data (V3)
S3: Unauthorized physical access to the monitor content
——————–Using the JTAG interface—————————
(e1)Acquire the hardware (F to F jumper wire, in-debugger-circuits, PC with
IDLE debugger)
(e1)Go to the patient’s home
(e2)Take the patient’s monitor
(e3)Connect one extremity of the F to F jumper wire to the monitor debug
port (exploiting V10)
(e4)Connect the other extremity of the F to F jumper wire to the in-debugger-
circuits
(e5)Connect the in-debugger-circuit to the PC
(e6)Access the monitor memory by means of the IDLE debugger
(e7)Use V13 and V14 to adjust the server settings and credentials to authen-
ticate to them
(e8)Access the server by means of the information obtained in (e8)
(e9)Read the patient’s medical data
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——————–Using the UART interface—————————
(e1)Acquire the hardware (Pirate bus, PC with IDLE debugger)
(e2)Go to the patient’s home
(e3)Take the patient’s monitor
(e4)Connect one end of the pirate bus to the monitor debug port (exploiting
V10)
(e5)Connect the other pirate bus end to the PC containing the IDLE debug-
ger
(e6)Access the monitor memory by means of the IDLE debugger
(e7)Use V13 and V14 to adjust the server settings and credentials to authen-
ticate to them
(e8)Access the server by means of the information obtained in (e7)
(e9)Read the patient’s medical data
S4 : Network attack on the Monitor
(e1)Gain access to the patients router the day of the monitors update
(e2)Intercept the updated firmware (V15)
(e3)Replace the firmware with a backdoor
S5: Web attack on programmers’ SW deployment network server
(e1)Find the URL in which the programmer (app) retrieve files from the
server
(e2)Modify URL with commands and web server escape code
(e3)Send the URL to the server(via http request) (e3)
(e4)Extract the desired files
S6 :Network attack on the programmers
(e1)Go to the hospital the day of the update
(e2)Access the programmers network
(e3)Leverage V7 to gain access to the programmer
(e3)Extract the desired files
S7: Network attack on the Monitor
(e1)Go to the patient home
(e2)Acces the patient network
(e3)Acces the monitors USB port (V9)
(e4)Navigate in the file system and extract the desired files
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S8: Network attack on the Programmer
(e1)Go to the hospital
(e2)Acces the hospital network
(e3)Acces the monitors USB port (V9)
(e4)Navigate the file system and extract the desired files
S9: Physical attack on the Programmer
(e1)Go to the hospital
(e2)Extract the programmers removable hard drive(V8)
S10: Physical attack on the monitor
——————–Using the JTAG interface—————————
(e1)Acquire the hardware ( F to F jumper wire, in-debugger-circuits, PC
with IDLEs debugger)
(e2)Go to the patients home
(e3)Take the patient’s monitor
(e4)Connect one end of the F to F jumper wire to the monitor debug port
(V10)
(e5)Connect the other end of the F to F jumper wire to the in-debugger-
circuits
(e6)Connect the in-debugger-circuit to the PC
(e7)Access the monitor memory by means of the IDLE debugger
(e8)Use V11 and V12 to adquer the credentials of OS
(e9)Access the OS of the monitor by means of the information obtained in e8
(e10)Read the OS
——————–Using the UART interface—————————
(e1)Acquire the hardware (Pirate bus, PC with IDLE debugger)
(e2)Go to the patients home
(e3)Take the patient’s monitor
(e4)Connect one end of the pirate bus to the monitor debug port (V10)
(e5)Connect the other pirate bus end to the PC containing the IDLE debug-
ger.
(e6)Access the monitor memory by means of the IDLE debugger
(e7)Use V11 and V12 to acquire the credentials of the OS
(e8)Access the OS of the monitor by means of the information obtained in e7
(e9)Read information about OS
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S11: Network attack on the programmer
(e1)Gain access to the CIED room consultation the day of the update
(e2)Intercept the updated firmware (V7)
(e3)Replacing the firmware with malware
S12: Radio attack on the CIED
(e1)Acquire the hardware (SDR, antenna, signal processing software)
(e2)Go to the hospital
(e3)Be located at a distance relatively close to the CIED
(e4)Configure the SDR in Transmission mode
(e5) Perform a frequency scan of the MICS band to determine the Program-
mer’s transmission frequency
(e6) Transmit commands (via RF signals) to the CIED (V1,V4,V5)
S13: Network attack on the programmer
(e1)Go to the hospital
(e2)Access the hospital network
(e3)Access the monitors USB port(V9)
(e4)Insert a malware
S14: Radio attack on the CIED
(e1)Acquire the hardware (SDR, antenna, signal processing software)
(e2)Go to the hospital
(e3)Be located at a distance relatively close to the CIED
(e4)Configure the SDR in Transmission mode
(e5) Perform a frequency scan of the MICS band to determine the Program-
mer’s transmission frequency
(e6) Transmit Wake-up commands (via RF signals) to the CIED periodically
(V1,V2,V4)
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